Towards a model of story puns

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Abstract

There is a class of joke which consists of an anecdote, which is sometimes quite long and often has no inherently humorous content, followed by a final line which is a distorted form of some well-known phrase, proverb or quotation. Usually this final line purports to summarize or draw a moral from the preceding story. This genre has some unusual aspects, from the viewpoint of conventional claims about the attributes of jokes. These jokes also have certain structural or formal regularities, which suggest that it might be possible to define a computational model of their production. We outline how this might be done, by decomposing the construction of such story puns into a sequence of stages; some of these are clearly manageable, others are less straightforward. We also make some observations about where such an endeavor would fit within the broader field of humor research.

Introduction

A particular class of joke, which we will call the story pun, has some unusual features from the point of view of a formal analysis of the internal semantic/pragmatic structure of jokes. At some level of abstraction, the regularities underlying story puns can be seen as analogous to those underlying certain classes of punning riddle, in that a superficial similarity between linguistic forms is the central mechanism. In past work (Binsted and Ritchie 1994, 1997), we have shown that punning riddles can be generated by computational rules. Here, we sketch some mechanisms which could potentially generate (some simple varieties of) story puns.
Although our guiding perspective is computational, the ideas are presented here in a relatively non-computational form.\textsuperscript{1}

Finally, we make some observations about what such a model might or might not demonstrate about the nature of humor.

**Story puns**

There is a particular genre of joke which is quite common within British society and in certain other cultures (e.g. the Netherlands, the USA). It consists of a story which need not itself have any humorous content (and which may be quite long by the normal standards of jokes), concluding with a single line which is usually a summing up of the content or moral of the story, although it may also be a suitable last line of the narrative or an utterance attributed to a character in the story (following common practice for jokes in general, we shall call this final line the *punchline*). There is no accepted name for this genre. They are sometimes known as *shaggy dog stories*, although that term is more often taken to refer to long anti-climactic stories rather than complex puns. Kurt Wenner (personal communication) suggests that the term *feghoot* has been in use within the USA since the 1950s. We have adopted the neutral term *story pun*.

What is peculiar to this genre is that the punchline is always a distorted form of some well-known saying, usually a proverb but sometimes a famous quotation. For example, there is a well-established proverb in the English language “People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones” (meaning that those who are vulnerable to a particular form of criticism should not themselves make that criticism of others). This has been used as the basis of the following joke:

Once upon a time, many years ago, there was a chieftain in a remote tropical village who owned an old and battered throne of which he was very fond. One day, a visiting dignitary gave him a brand new and ornate throne, which the chieftain had to adopt immediately out of politeness. However, he could not bear to part with the old throne which had served him so well, so he stowed it away in the roof area of his grass hut, in case it should be useful in the future. Unfortunately the interior structure of his hut was too flimsy to support the weight of the large object, and it crashed through the grass ceiling, falling on the chieftain and killing him.

The moral is that people who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow thrones.
Many examples of these *story puns* have been constructed (there are around 150 in Muir and Norden (1991)), although few survive into common circulation. It is possible to use the construction of such jokes as a game or pastime, in which one person stipulates the original (undistorted) maxim, and another person has to construct the story pun (this was what occurred in the radio show reported in Muir and Norden (1991)).

**Features of this genre**

These jokes have some noteworthy features:

The *meaning* of the original, undistorted proverb plays no role in the joke at all — it is necessary only that the *wording* of the proverb be sufficiently familiar to the listener that it is evoked by the distorted form. This is in contrast to jokes typified by the much-cited “One more drink and I’ll be under the host” (Dorothy Parker), where one factor in the humorous effect is the meaning of the related phrase “under the table”.

If the audience is completely unaware of the original version of the punchline, there is no humorous effect.

If a punchline is used whose meaning is virtually identical to the distorted proverb, but which uses different *wording*, there is no humorous effect. This is little more than a statement that these are a subclass of puns, since puns inherently rely on their wording.

It is essential for the humorous effect that the maxim be *distorted*. A story in which a character living in a glass house came to grief as a result of throwing stones, concluding with the ungarbled proverb about such situations, would not have the same humorous effect. (Another genre might be possible in which the punchline is an actual *undistorted* maxim and humor is produced by the indirect or unusual way in which the proverb applies to this particular story. However, these would be different from the type of joke we are considering here.)

As with many other forms of pun, the listener’s reaction to a story pun is often to groan rather than to laugh, which emphasizes that the main story portion is essentially setting up a context in which a pun can be made. In this way, story puns are comparable to real-life wit where someone achieves a humorous effect by describing some (actual) event or situation in a garbled form of a well-known maxim.

What is particularly interesting about the structure of these jokes is that various attributes of the main part of the story and the punchline...
(and the relationship between them) are different from those which are often posited as central to more conventional jokes. In particular, three of the central factors often posited for humorous texts (see, for example, the review in Attardo (1994)) appear to be absent, as follows.

**Ambiguity**

It has been argued that many jokes depend on the fact that the main part of the text (sometimes known as the *setup* (Attardo 1997) or *joke body* (Godkewitsch 1976)) is compatible with more than one interpretation, although only one interpretation may be obvious to the audience initially. The final part of the text, the *punchline*, then resolves this ambiguity, often in favor of the less obvious meaning. As Ritchie (1999) observes, this notion of *sudden disambiguation* is very widespread within the literature. Its importance is typified by the following quotation:

Deliberate ambiguity will be shown to underlie much, if not all, of verbal humor. (Raskin 1985: p. xiii)

Such a pattern of interpretation does not appear to occur in story puns. The natural assumption is that the last line (the distorted maxim) forms the punchline, with the preceding material forming the setup. However, no matter how we make the setup/punchline division, there appears to be no use of ambiguity, in the accepted sense of that word. The story, with or without the punchline, unambiguously describes a series of events. The original undistorted proverb can be recovered by the astute reader, but it is *not* an “alternative reading” of the punchline. For example, “People who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow thrones” may *remind* the reader of the proverb “People who lives in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones”; however, the latter is not an alternative *interpretation* of the former.

**Incongruity**

A common ingredient of many theories of humor is incongruity, although (as argued by Ritchie (1999)), the meaning of this term may vary across authors, and there are no clear and precise definitions available. The usual
forms of incongruity discussed by authors are as follows:

(i) The situation described in the joke text is absurd in some way; in an ambiguity-based joke (see above) this absurdity may reside in the less obvious meaning.

(ii) Where there is ambiguity, there is a clash between the two readings (this is the idea behind the Semantic Script Theory of Humor (Raskin 1985)).

(iii) The punchline clashes with the expectations established by the setup.

None of these apply in the case of story puns. Although story puns can have added humorous effect by dealing with bizarre or absurd situations, this is not inherent to their operation. Since there is no ambiguity, there can be no conflict of interpretations. The punchline is always a suitable (congruous) ending, albeit worded in an unusual way. There is nothing in the meaning of the punchline that conveys incongruous concepts. The original undistorted adage may or may not be incongruous with the story; in most cases, it is simply irrelevant (as in the example given above). Nonetheless, the unambiguous interpretation of the actual punchline is always an appropriate end to the story.

It could be argued that there is “incongruity” between the original adage and the distorted one, but it is hard to see how this relates to any of the forms of incongruity normally posited to account for humor. The two variants of the punchline are certainly different, but presumably incongruity is more than just difference. There is no evidence that it is the difference between the lines that causes the humor. One could equally plausibly claim that an important factor is the marked similarity between the lines, but it would be hard to force that under a heading of “incongruity”. In fact, in some cases, even the interpretations of the original and distorted adages are quite congruous (e.g. “People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones” and “People who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow thrones” are both warnings that people should not take particular actions which could have adverse consequences if they are in certain vulnerable situations).

Violated expectations

Much humor is produced by the violation of the audience’s expectations in some way, as has often been observed. Story puns do not set up and violate expectations in any way.
Some assumptions

In tackling a topic as broad and as deep as humor, or even just verbally expressed humor, there are a number of different methodological strategies that could be adopted.

One possibility (perhaps exemplified by the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin 1991)) is to devise a very general theory which attempts to encompass all possible phenomena in the area under consideration. Particular studies of subspecies of humor are then carried out within this overall framework, guided by its form and its principles. This is logically a very sound approach, avoiding the temptation to posit *ad hoc* devices, and integrating all work under one theory. Its drawback, in the current state of our understanding of humor, is that such a theory may be over-general to the point of vagueness, or (if more specific) may contain arbitrary details included prior to the evidence having been gathered. This sort of approach could be loosely labeled as *top-down*.

Alternatively, one could adopt a more *bottom-up* approach, in which detailed studies are made of particular humorous phenomena, using whatever theoretical constructs appear appropriate for that domain. This has the advantage that research can be fairly concrete, leading to the possibility of real empirical testing. For example, Binsted et al. (1997) describe how a symbolic model of punning riddles was tested extremely thoroughly by computer implementation followed by controlled evaluation of the computer output. Moreover, fine details can be examined, as the precision makes it meaningful to vary small aspects of the model, and (if computer implemented) the consequences of any variations can be determined directly. The drawback, of course, is that the analyses may exist in a vacuum, unconnected to other phenomena, and the mechanisms devised may be over-specific.

In reality, some blend of these two extremes is necessary, and is normally used. One cannot devise a general theory (top-down) without at least keeping an eye on the data, and one cannot work on particular data (bottom-up) without assuming (perhaps implicitly) at least some theoretical basis.

The work presented here, although sketchy and speculative, tends towards the bottom-up end of the scale. As we happen to be working within a computational methodology, our immediate strategy is to seek particular phenomena which can be precisely described in a manner which
is computationally tractable, or nearly tractable, and which can therefore be pursued in some depth. A more firmly top-down approach, while valuable, might not reach actual computational implementation for many decades. There is an analogy here with the way in which linguistic theory has developed over past decades and centuries. Much of the early work involved the detailed development of grammars (or fragments of grammar) for particular languages, in the absence of any over-arching theory of language. Although theory-development became a prominent activity in its own right under the influence of Chomsky, even modern generative linguistics started from concepts (e.g. phrase structure) which had been developed within much more specific and pre-theoretical streams of work.

We would argue that at the moment there are no theories of humor which are sufficiently detailed and well-defined to allow their application in any meaningful way to our chosen topic of story-puns. Most “theories” are of the “top-down”, general sort, which encapsulate all humor under some very broad rubric (e.g. “Laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift” (Morreall 1983)). Although these observations are stimulating, and often embody intuitively plausible insights, they tend to be rather underdefined from the viewpoint of detailed predictions about actual data (i.e. jokes). The most widely cited set of proposals is the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin 1991), which is still very sketchy and which lacks formal definitions for most of its central constructs. Our attempts to describe particular subclasses of humor (here, story puns) are not intended to compete as general theories of humor. Instead, they have the less ambitious aim of finding regularities within the data, in the hope that this might, in the longer term, help in the construction of a more general account of a wider class of humorous texts (we return to this point towards the end of the paper).

A word is in order about the role of computer modeling within our research. Within artificial intelligence research, it is commonplace to try to embody one’s ideas in a working computer program. This is not because the production of computer programs is an end in itself, but because the design, implementation and testing of the program forces one to be more precise, more detailed, and more rigorous in defining and stating one’s proposals. The program itself may be “disposable”, in the sense that the real creations are the ideas on which it is based, which may have developed into a more articulated form as a result of the discipline of having to create a program.
Particularly in the early stages of such work, the program will often embody a highly simplified version of the general theory or model, since it may be impractical to implement the full theory. This is particularly true where the proposals involve the use, within the model, of general knowledge about the world, since it is usually not possible for the computer program to have the same amount of knowledge as the average human being, nor for it to reason with this knowledge as flexibly. Hence there is a tradition of working either with a severely reduced versions of one’s theory, or sometimes just using very simple data. If the aim were to have the computer program act as a fully intelligent (and witty) human agent, this might be a major problem, since it would be impaired from the start. However, the role of the program in a great deal of research (including ours) is more as an exhaustive tester of a set of symbolic rules, much as a generative grammar for a language could be tested for its coverage by feeding the rules into a computer program. The JAPE program (Binsted and Ritchie 1997), for example, was not intended as an intelligent joke-creating program; rather, it was a tool for comprehensively checking the consequences of the “rules” proposed for punning riddles.

A model of story-pun construction

Overview

We have devised a relatively crude model of how story puns could be produced. (This is not a model of how such jokes could be interpreted.) Although we think of this process as computational, the presentation here will be rather more abstract, describing a sequence of steps, each of which is some process controlled by rules of some sort. As we will explain below, some of the components are still underspecified in this preliminary design, but we believe that the role of each stage is relatively well-defined. The steps in the model could be summarized as follows:

Choose a maxim.
Distort this maxim.
Construct a semantic representation of the distorted version.
Develop some constraints from this semantic structure.
Devise a story to meet these constraints.
Constructing the punchline

The original (undistorted) proverb or saying could be regarded as input data for the process, as in the “game” form of joke-construction mentioned in earlier. Alternatively, we could assume that our proposed joke-generator would have access to a set of proverbs, quotations and other well-known sayings, and that it would initially choose one at random.

Construction of possible target punchlines from a given maxim is not too problematic. The punchline should be similar to the original in some sense. The notion of similarity is essentially that which is used in punning riddles (Pepicello and Green 1984), where puns can be based on inexact matches between words. Tactics that are suitable include metathesis (spoonerism) (e.g. “throw stones” → “stow thrones”) and substitution of a phonetically similar segment (e.g. “glass” → “grass”). There might be a large number of phrases or sentences which could be produced from the same original saying, so heuristics might have to be developed to choose the more productive or suitable ones. On the other hand, the next step in our process, analyzing the punchline, might succeed only on a few distorted maxims, so that pre-selection becomes unnecessary; that is, a set of possible punchlines could be passed to the next phase, letting that later stage filter out unviable variants.

Analyzing the punchline

The punchline, as constructed, is still just a sequence of words, as the garbling process operated at a very low level, manipulating phonetic information. For the punchline to influence the construction of a suitable story, there must be a representation of its content. To produce this, there must be a way to scan a sentence and construct a symbolic representation of its meaning in some suitable formalism (e.g. some type of logic).

Constructing the story

What is involved — There is at present no consensus on how a story could be formally specified, let alone computer generated, although there is a considerable literature on literary analysis of fables (Carnes 1985),
creative writing (Evans and Powell 1990), and story generation (Meehan 1976, Kantrowitz 1990).

For the purposes of our exposition here, we will regard the problem as having two aspects: representation and production. That is, we distinguish the issue of what the content of a story is (and what sorts of abstract objects, relations, etc. are needed to support it) from the more procedural aspect of creating such a story (e.g. computationally).

Representing the story — As noted above, there is no consensus theory of what constitutes a story, and hence no agreement about what content has to be represented. This representation, for generality, would have to contain information not only about events, situations and characters in the world being described; it would also have to represent the narrative presentation (e.g. the order in which events are described). There is no obvious answer to the question of what symbolic formalism can be used to represent story content and narrative presentation. However, this is secondary to the question of what substance should be represented. We suggest that, once we know what we wish to represent, we should be able to use some abstract knowledge representation system, such as a traditional logic, or something of the “KL-ONE” family (Brachman and Schmolze 1985).

Constraining the story — Most computational work on story generation has focused on methods which would actually construct a story from some basic material, such as information about the characters and their goals. An alternative approach would be to attempt to define declarative constraints or preferences describing the formally represented structure of the story. That is, using ideas from the various disciplines mentioned in earlier, we would formulate a set of heuristic rules which, given a formally represented story (or candidate for being a story) would evaluate its merit as a story. We do not believe that there is really some abstract measure of “quality” that can be used to rate real stories. However, there are some very crude guidelines which can be used to separate those structures which barely count as stories from those which are at least well-formed stories. The basis for this belief is that literature on creative writing can be viewed as attempts to do just this. For example, when a textbook advises “Never switch viewpoints in the middle of a scene” (Dibell 1995, Bickham 1993), it is formulating a heuristic that could be applied to a symbolic representation of a story to make some estimate of its
competence or success. (Notice that it is crucial that we have some formal, abstract representation of the story, as it would be completely infeasible to apply such abstract heuristics to the bare textual form of a story.)

A constraint-based (or “evaluative”) approach such as this has the advantage that the very heterogeneous requirements of the story pun can all be accommodated. A story pun has certain requirements which might not arise in more conventional story generation:

The plot must (somehow) conform to (the meaning of) the pre-determined final punchline or “pseudo-moral”.

Enough suitable concepts and vocabulary items must be introduced in the course of the story to make the final punchline relatively natural.

Nevertheless, for the story pun to be humorously effective, there should not be so much preparation within the story that the punchline can be easily predicted. (It is easier to succeed with a story pun if the audience does not know in advance the approximate shape of the punchline; it is a sign of the skills of Muir and Norden (1991) that their stories amuse even when the original (undistorted) proverb is known in advance.)

All these requirements are of a very varied nature, so some very general scheme is needed for their representation. (We do not suggest that formalising these requirements would be trivial.)

**Producing the story**

Let us assume that we have managed to achieve the goals listed above — we have devised a formal representation for the content (including presentation) of such stories, and we have developed a set of heuristics which will contribute to the rating of how well a story meets our needs. How then can we *produce* such a story? Although we may have ways of telling how good a story is once we have it fully represented, we need some way of creating the structures. Clearly, the space of possibilities is very large.

This formulation — computing an object which yields a suitably high value when certain evaluation criteria are applied to it — is a standard approach within artificial intelligence. In general, such problems can be viewed as *heuristic search* (Nilsson 1971). Although there is no easy solution to such search problems, there is at least an established methodology for tackling such problems.
How feasible is this?

Let us summarize what would be needed to make this work in an actual computer program, bearing in mind the methodological assumptions and limitations discussed earlier.

**Punchline construction**

This initial phase of the process seems straightforward. Given some basic lexical information (including phonetics), distorting a sentence into a similar-sounding sentence is not difficult.

**Punchline analysis**

It is completely possible, in theory, to analyze a sentence of English into a representation of its literal meaning. In practice, it would (in the current state of the art) not be trivial to construct a computer program which would provide correct analyses of arbitrary sentences with any level of syntactic complexity, formulated from a wide vocabulary. Although the story domain could be simplified for test purposes, the punchlines come from a very unconstrained source, namely existing proverbs and sayings. Not only does this widen the vocabulary greatly, it could introduce some quite unusual grammatical forms.

A possible simplification that could be considered (if attempting to implement this model) would be to restrict the model to morals stated as commands, so that any variant of the punchline which could not be analyzed as a simple imperative would be eliminated. The representation of the meaning of the punchline would then not indicate any illocutionary force, since a meaning would just be a statement of the desired state of affairs.

**Representing the story**

Story generation is very hard, and there is no prospect of having a good quality completely computer-generated fictional story in the near future. Generating a story which is guaranteed to be summed up by a given punchline is therefore the hardest part of this preliminary design. In
order to make some progress, we believe it is both valid and feasible to constrain the type of story in various ways, so that our generator will be operating in a much smaller space of possibilities. There are various genres of story which seem to have certain stereotypical attributes, involving the types of characters, the types of events, the types of goals that characters have, the situations that characters may be in, etc. In particular, fables (Lenaghan 1967), fairy stories (Conroy and Rossel 1980) and Greek myths (Sgouros, Papakonstantinou, and Tsanakas 1996) all appear promising. These relatively stylized genres also have the advantage of comparatively straightforward narrative devices — they make little use of flashbacks, multiple viewpoints, etc. In the program of research we are outlining here, we would select one such genre as our area of study.

Representing a story would require significant research, but (given the use of a narrow, stylized genre), it should be feasible to develop some (comparatively crude) formal representation. It has to be recognized, however, that taking short-cuts here could have a deleterious effect on the story-evaluation issue.

Evaluating a story

This is the most difficult (and perhaps most interesting) part. It would involve significant research, with a synthesis of ideas from a number of disciplines.

Producing the story

If the previous steps, particularly the formulation of an evaluation measure, are achieved, then it may be feasible to devise a search mechanism to generate possible solutions (e.g. using some form of heuristic search (Nilsson 1971) or genetic algorithms (Mitchell 1996)).

Discussion

Let us imagine that we manage to construct a program along the lines outlined above. What import (if any) would success in the small area of story-pun generation have for a (computational) theory of humor?
What is noticeable about the proposed design is that none of the separate stages purport to embody or rely upon a theory of humor in any way. Each, viewed in isolation, is a non-humorous process. It is the overall effect which (we argue) will be humorous. This is not paradoxical, as it is quite acceptable for the whole to create an effect that is not attributable to any one of its parts. However, nothing in the design process was driven by any theory of what was or was not funny. Rather, its basis was on observing regularities in a process which was deemed humorous, and attempting to model these regularities (cf. remarks in our section on “Assumptions”, on the “bottom-up” approach). If it were successful, we would have created a model of a class of jokes without explicit use of a theory of humor. Hence, it is not clear what such a working program would prove or disprove. It may be an experiment, loosely speaking, but what hypothesis does it test?

It is important to realize that a computer program (or even an algorithmic but unimplemented model) may embody theoretical claims or assumptions, even although these are not explicitly represented and even although the system designers were not consciously aware of them. Any design has implicit assumptions, and these may depend upon some unarticulated theory of how humor works. It is commonplace for novice research workers in artificial intelligence (typically, students) to build computer programs without a clear abstract or theoretical model, and to try (with difficulty) to determine afterwards what assumptions constitute their de facto theory. We are perhaps in that position. We have to confess ignorance of what theory of humor has led to the proposal outlined here.

Our outline of the structure of story-puns posited the following linguistic aspects of story-puns:

(i) The story-pun can be usefully segmented into a (long) initial part, which tells a story, and a short final part, typically one sentence, which produces the humorous effect.
(ii) The final part is a garbled version of some well-known saying.
(iii) The final part claims to summarize or provide a moral for the story.

It is quite hard to see this as relying on any “theory of humor”. Although the segmentation into “setup” and “punchline” may have been suggested by previous authors for other types of jokes, it is hardly a major theoretical proposal, nor is it distinctive of any particular theory of humor.
This may be a symptom of the very early stage of the development of formal (or computational) models of humor. As noted at the start of this paper, there is not a good, detailed, formal theoretical framework on which to base detailed investigations of specific genres of humor. In this situation, one possible (and perhaps essential) first step is to investigate and formalize what might be termed the major structural aspects of humorous texts. That is, a joke genre (such as story puns) will be based on certain (fairly gross) relationships between formal entities. These can be seen as necessary characteristics for a text to qualify as a member of the genre. However, some of the texts which meet these gross structural criteria will not be very funny at all, whereas others will be extremely funny. Study of why there are these variations in funniness should take us much closer to the essential aspects of humor, and so might seem to be more important than the modeling of the "major structural" aspects. However, the formal statement of the major structural aspects provides a foundation upon which more detailed and subtle studies can be based. Until the undergrowth has been cleared away, it is difficult to focus clearly on the fine detail.

A loose analogy can be made with the role of syntax in a theory of language. Even someone who believes that the most essential aspect of language is its meaning is likely to concede that it is unrealistic to attempt to develop a theory of natural language semantics in complete isolation from syntax. Indeed, the more clearly grammatical issues are understood, the less there will be unwanted distractions in the study of meaning. Although the methodological points argued above have been stated with respect to a non-existent program (i.e. the story pun generator whose content we have outlined), they could largely be illustrated with respect to a working program — the JAPE riddle-generator (Binsted and Ritchie 1994, 1997, Binsted et al. 1997). That program generates punning riddles which (at their best) are of a standard comparable to those circulating amongst schoolchildren. It was designed entirely by observing the formal regularities within such riddles, and modeling these patterns in abstract rules. Although it could be argued that the design is influenced by, or illustrates, ideas about ambiguity, any relationship to a general theory of humor is very obscure. Nevertheless, that work clears the way for more fundamental questions to be asked, such as what types of ambiguity enhance humorous effect.

More generally, there is the point that was already made in our preliminary discussion — we have to try out lots of small-scale studies
just to stimulate ideas about what the ingredients might be of a final theory of humor.

What next?

We have argued that:

(i) Story puns form a well-defined genre of joke with characteristics quite different from most told jokes.
(ii) There are formal regularities in story puns which suggest a generator could be decomposed into independent stages.
(iii) Most of these proposed modules could be constructed, at least in some simple form, using currently known techniques.
(iv) This outline design, whether implemented or not, has no apparent links to any theory of humor in general, but might be a useful preliminary step in formalizing structural aspects of one subclass of joke.

The next steps, for those with time, inclination and funding, would be to try implementing such a system and then to experiment with the various factors involved, to see what makes one story pun funnier than another.

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Notes

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1. This paper is a revised and shortened version of Binsted and Ritchie (1996).
2. Notice that we are not arguing that similar processes are never used in other types of joke, nor that these processes cannot be used, along with other mechanisms, to create humorous effects. For example, distortion of a phrase or sentence is used in various kinds of puns, including spoonerisms, but mere distortion on its own does not create humor. Other kinds of puns usually have some other ingredients besides simple distortion; for example, spoonerisms require a particular pattern of sounds.
3. The first author is now at Sony Computer Science Laboratory Inc., Takanawa Muse Building, 3-14-13 Higashi-Gotanda Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141, Japan.

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